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Every mention in this publication of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is marked by an asterisk (*). This refers to the following footnote: Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
Bucharest: the place where answers take shape?

‘It is better to know some of the questions than all of the answers,’ said the US writer James Thurber in the middle of the last century. He remains right today.

At its Bucharest Summit, NATO will be looking at the right questions and working towards real answers. These largely concern changing security challenges and how to dealing with them. In both cases, there are clear, present day needs – and unknown future ones.

Current day challenges in Afghanistan and Kosovo are well documented. But future and emerging challenges such as climate change security implications and cyber-defence are still evolving. All require close attention.

And this leads on to questions for NATO: about what it is – and what it will become. Several of these questions are tackled in this edition of NATO Review, starting with a piece by NATO’s Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer.

Other authors look at questions such as: Is it not sooner rather than later that a move towards a new Strategic Concept is necessary? How can Partnerships evolve to suit both NATO and Partner countries? And what is NATO’s role to be in areas such as energy security?

There are two sides to most dilemmas. And helping choose which side is, in a way, what the Bucharest Summit is about. This task will not end at the Summit. But as Romania’s President, Traian Băsescu, says in his article, ‘Bucharest could be a bridge between our past achievements and new tasks.’

Paul King
Editor, NATO Review
Bucharest: a milestone in NATO's transformation

On April 3 and 4, in Bucharest, NATO will hold its next Summit meeting. This event is part of a three-Summit-strategy that started with the Riga Summit in 2006 and will conclude with NATO's 60th Anniversary Summit next year. Within this rather short time span, we want to significantly accelerate NATO’s transformation: with stronger operational capabilities, and new political relationships with other nations and institutions, the Alliance will be a much more effective security provider in an increasingly globalised and more dangerous world.

Within a rather short time span, we want to significantly accelerate NATO’s transformation

In terms of the number of nations participating, the Bucharest Summit will be NATO’s biggest ever. Heads of State or Government from all 26 NATO nations, partner countries from across the globe, and representatives from many major international institutions will come together to discuss new ways of building security. Nothing could underscore more clearly NATO’s evolving role as a hub of broader coalitions – a flexible political-military instrument at the service not just of its own member nations, but also at the service of the wider international community.

What will be the major issues at the Bucharest Summit? Four key areas stand out.

Operations
First of all, our Bucharest Summit will feature a strong focus on NATO’s operational commitments. Over 60,000 brave men and women are deployed in NATO-led missions and operations today, on three different continents. At Bucharest, we will underline the commitment of all 26 Allies to the success of those operations, and send a strong message of support in particular to the people of Kosovo and Afghanistan.

As far as Kosovo is concerned, the Allies have made clear that KFOR will remain there on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1244, unless the UN Security Council decides otherwise. KFOR is there to ensure a safe and secure environment – for all the people of Kosovo.

But they have also stressed that this should be a controlled and coordinated process. The Balkans lie at the heart of Europe and they are vital to the stability of the continent. We want all countries from the region to integrate with the rest of Europe. That is why NATO will continue to help Kosovo to get on its feet, but also continue to assist reform efforts by Serbia, as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro.

We must continue to help Afghanistan to become a stable, democratic, and properly governed nation

Afghanistan represents a long-term commitment for NATO. We must continue to help Afghanistan to become a stable, democratic, and properly governed nation that no longer exports terrorism, crime and drugs to our nations and the rest of the world. There are clear signs of progress, in a number of areas – better education, economic growth, functioning institutions. The challenge before us is to reinforce and sustain that progress.

by Mr Jaap de Hoop Scheffer
NATO Secretary General
I expect our Bucharest Summit to agree on a clear strategy for the way ahead in Afghanistan – with a robust NatO presence underlining our commitment; enhanced training of the Afghan National Army to make sure the Afghans are better able to look after their own security; better interaction between international organisations, including with the United Nations and the European Union, to make sure that security goes hand in hand with reconstruction and development; and a strong appeal to Afghanistan’s neighbours to support our common goal of a stable and democratic Afghanistan.

Enlargement

A second major issue that will be high on the agenda of our Bucharest Summit is NatO enlargement. The NatO Allies have committed to issue invitations at Bucharest to aspirant countries that meet our performance-based standards, and that are able to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security. We have been working hard in the context of our Membership Action Plan (MAP) to assist Albania, Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* with their preparations for eventual membership. And it is clear that, if they were to join, that would be a major step in the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Balkans region.

As I write these words, nothing has been decided yet. All three MAP countries still have work to do to merit an invitation. As in previous rounds of NatO enlargement, the Bucharest decision will ultimately be a political one. I cannot and do not want to prejudge that decision here and now. It will reflect the consensus among our current 26 members on the next stage of NatO enlargement. Clearly, though, NatO does not suffer from enlargement fatigue – and I hope that the same can be said for the European Union (EU). Because it is the combination of NatO and EU enlargement that offers the best guarantee for long-term peace and stability on our continent.

Transformation

Third, our Bucharest Summit must advance the adaptation of NatO’s own structures and capabilities to the new security environment. It is obvious that not all security challenges require military solutions, but military competence has been, and no doubt will remain, crucial for dealing with many of them. And so it is vital that the Alliance maintains it military edge, and that all our member nations continue to make the necessary investments – in making our forces more flexible and useable, and giving them the right equipment to do their job.

While we reinforce our ability to meet current requirements, we must also look ahead and prepare for emerging security challenges. In light of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, we have decided to take a fresh look at missile defence, and to examine ways to make the system which the United States has been discussing with Poland and the Czech Republic complementary to ongoing NatO programmes. But we are also looking at ways to better protect the security of our energy infrastructures and how NatO can add value to efforts by the international community to ensure greater energy security. And we are developing policies to improve the protection of NatO’s key information systems against Internet crime and cyber attacks.

Partnership

The fourth and final Bucharest Summit issue that I wish to highlight is the development of NatO’s partnership relations. Over the past 15 years, NatO has helped non-member countries all across Europe to meet difficult reform challenges – and this has been a major boost to the security and stability of the continent. Many of our Euro-Atlantic Partners have shown a strong determination to be providers of security rather than mere consumers, by making valuable contributions to NatO missions and operations. And so NatO has a strong interest in

* Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name
continuing this Partnership policy – to tailor it even better to the needs and requirements of our Euro-Atlantic Partners – and to further engage them in meeting today’s security challenges. There will be a meeting with our Euro-Atlantic Partners in conjunction with our Bucharest Summit, and that will be an excellent opportunity to reach out to our Partners all over Europe and Central Asia.

Russia is part and parcel of this Partnership effort, and I look forward to its participation at the Bucharest Summit. Despite its recent harsh rhetoric, and the stance which it has taken on issues such as Kosovo and the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, Russia occupies a special place among NATO’s Partners. We value and want to continue our constructive and frank dialogue with Russia, including on issues on which we disagree, and to continue to look for common ground. As far as NATO is concerned, there really are no “red lines”, and no limits, on how far our relationship can go.

Finally, we also want to strengthen NATO’s partnership network beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. From Northern Africa to the Middle East to the Asia Pacific region, interest in NATO is rising – and for good reason. Countries in these regions have carefully observed NATO’s evolution. They have concluded that many of NATO’s operations benefit their own security, and that it is in their interest to work with the NATO team. We in NATO should make that possible – by engaging in dialogue, opening new channels of cooperation, and enhancing the interoperability of our forces with those of interested countries.

Looking beyond Bucharest

As I mentioned at the beginning, the Bucharest Summit will not be an isolated event. It will further the implementation of many decisions taken at the previous Summit in Riga, as well as generate decisions to be implemented in the months ahead. Next year, when NATO will be celebrating its 60th anniversary, we will take NATO’s transformation another major step further. I believe that this should include a decision to revisit NATO’s conceptual foundations, possibly by starting work on a new Strategic Concept. Such a document should lay out why NATO is unique; how it is transforming; and how it will tackle the core security challenges before us. It will strengthen our common purpose, and it will ensure that NATO remains understood by our publics, and relevant to their security needs.
This year Romania will have the honor of hosting NATO’s Bucharest Summit. The event will happen in a time and place full of symbolism. Since the creation of the Partnership for Peace, 14 years ago, NATO has added ten new members. The Alliance has forged a culture of cooperation, advised on defence reforms and developed political dialogue. In doing so, it has also respected the interests and needs of its Partners from the Balkans to Eastern Europe and across the Black Sea towards the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Enlargement has been a successful and visionary endeavor. NATO members have enhanced their security by extending it to other states sharing common values. The Alliance has also developed a wide network of Partnerships that allows us to better protect and promote these values. Through integration and partnership, NATO has helped unify Europe around freedom, stability and democracy.

In the East, the Black Sea region is part of this promotion of democracy and stability throughout Europe. This region, which sits at the crossroads of Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East, is also a hub for trade, energy and transportation links. Governments and people are working towards security, modernization and better lives, while coping with protracted conflicts and cross-border crime.
There have been reforms and democratic transformation, but challenges remain and NATO assistance and support is still needed.

Achieving this requires Russia to be engaged in the process. The NATO-Russia partnership has begun another decade. In spite of hurdles, it remains a strategic element in fostering security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Romania is interested in a solid NATO partnership with Russia. This can help safeguard arms control regimes in Europe, fight terrorism and foster stability and democracy across the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. Our partnership with Russia offers open dialogue and cooperation among equal partners, based on our shared interest in strengthening European and international security.

The Alliance in the 21st century

While continuing to play a critical role in European security, NATO has also tried to encourage stability outside of Europe. To those who question our renewed agenda, we can only emphasise that Trans-Atlantic collective defence cannot be served in isolation.

NATO’s first ever activation of the collective defense clause after 9/11 proved not only our commitment to the fundamental character of our Alliance, but also our capacity to respond to new threats and security challenges, such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and regional instability. We have launched maritime security operation in the Mediterranean and made anti-terrorism cooperation a priority across partnerships. Building bridges outside of Europe has also meant engaging countries in North Africa and the Middle East, through the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.
NATO’s adaptation to the changing security environment has brought a valuable contribution to international security. Not just because remote instability can impact on the Trans-Atlantic area, but also because the Alliance has the expertise and instruments necessary to help foster security, in tandem with the UN and the EU. That is why we have made Alliance’s largest post-Cold War personnel and financial investment in Afghanistan. A stable Afghanistan is key to stability and prosperity in Central and South Asia, which in turn benefits the Middle East and Europe. We would like to see the ancient silk routes revived not as conduits for terrorism or narcotics, but through stability and cooperation.

We hope NATO’s contribution to stability and security will go a step further in Bucharest. We should start talking seriously about a new strategic outlook that will help maintain the Alliance as a robust organization, capable of addressing evolving security challenges, both near and far, and prepared to enlist partner countries willing and able to contribute to set objectives and missions.

Preparing for the Bucharest Summit

At the Bucharest Summit, we hope to be able to invite Albania, Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as members of the Alliance, and we encourage them to step up their preparations for this.

We aim to enhance the Euro-Atlantic Partnership as NATO’s main policy of engagement across Europe and Eurasia.

We want NATO to reconfirm its engagement in the Western Balkans, by maintaining its presence in Kosovo and by enhancing partnerships with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia.

We also hope the Alliance will continue its engagement and enlargement policy across the Black Sea region, by strengthening its support for Georgia and Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations, as well as for its partnership with the Republic of Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Georgia has made great strides in its democratic transformation and in contributing to NATO’s operations. We hope the Summit will end up with decisions in support of Georgia’s bid for the NATO Membership Action Plan. We are also ready to assist Ukraine in fulfilling its Euro-Atlantic integration goals, based on sustainable political will and support of its people. NATO should further develop its cooperation with the Partners in Central Asia to support regional and Euro-Atlantic security.

We should start talking seriously about a new strategic outlook that will help maintain the Alliance as a robust organization, capable of addressing evolving security challenges.

Bucharest is also an opportunity to advance NATO’s comprehensive contribution to international security. We look forward to reconfirming the Alliance’s solid commitment in Afghanistan and refreshing our strategy together with our mission partners. We also hope the Summit will mark renewed NATO-UN cooperation, as well as stronger ties with our partners for security, Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea, based on our common interest.

We should send out the message that a strong and active NATO reinforces a strong European Union and vice-versa. Further expanding NATO-EU partnership in Kosovo, Afghanistan and our neighbourhood will remain a priority for Romania – and we hope this process will also bring Turkey closer to Europe.

The Summit would be a good venue to move forward on developing a NATO missile defence system, complementary and integrated to the one already developed by the US. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery means we strongly believe that the allied states should continue to work seriously on this. The indivisibility of Trans-Atlantic security, collective defence and solidarity will remain fundamental, NATO should be at the forefront of this endeavour.

We also look forward to defining NATO’s value added in energy security, taking the Riga Summit decisions one step further. We should speed up identifying a niche role for NATO in this field, using the unique assets of the organization and avoiding unnecessary duplications with others. We must also bear in mind that energy concerns go hand in hand with environmental protection.

In a nutshell, the Bucharest Summit could be a bridge between NATO’s Euro-Atlantic and international engagements, between our past achievements and new tasks in view of the anniversary Summit in 2009 and Summits thereafter. We have the chance to open debates and start charting our way forward towards a new strategic concept that will increase NATO’s capabilities and missions to secure stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond.

With best wishes,
Traian Băsescu
Diego A. Ruiz Palmer looks at the growing risks posed at sea, how NATO has reacted and what it needs to do to ensure it keeps pace with a changing maritime risk environment.

The Bucharest Summit will mark yet another milestone in NATO’s continuing transformation and an opportunity to consider how the Alliance should best confront emerging risks and contribute to enhanced international security. With worldwide energy demand growing and the price of oil having reached $100 a barrel, instances of piracy at sea on the rise and the world’s oceans and seas being turned into increasingly lawless and dangerous spaces, it is hardly a surprise that maritime security is steadily moving up on NATO’s agenda.
Already at the Riga Summit in November 2006, NATO Heads of State and Government had tasked assessments on energy security, reflecting a growing concern over risks to energy supply, infrastructure and shipping. Few security issues in the years ahead are likely to attract as much political attention as maritime security, because of its cross-cutting nature, straddling issues of international security, sovereignty, energy assurance, economic prosperity, law enforcement and defence. Maritime security is also likely to have important implications for NATO’s operations, transformation and partnerships.

A changing reality at sea

The world’s oceans and seas are the lifelines of global trade and economic prosperity. World-wide ship-borne trade has quadrupled in volume since 1965. Today, more than 90 percent of all trade is sea-bound. This translates in the Mediterranean Sea alone into 5,000 merchant ships at sea daily. But, with globalisation, the easing of movement across borders and the information revolution, the world’s oceans and seas have also become an increasingly accessible environment for a variety of criminal activities like illegal immigration, human trafficking, weapons smuggling, narcotics trafficking and piracy, as well as potentially hostile endeavours, such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The world’s oceans and seas are also becoming a source of geopolitical competition. Geographically, risk areas may extend from the maritime approaches to the Indian Ocean to the South Atlantic’s sea lanes to shipping rights in the Arctic Ocean. Against these varied risks, a number of international legal instruments to combat illegal seaborne activity are already in place. But only strengthened international cooperation and a multi-tiered response involving a range of intelligence, law enforcement and military capabilities can help ensure lasting success.

NATO’s operational record

As an alliance composed of many nations with extended coastlines, proud seafaring traditions, large naval capabilities, and extensive trading interests, it is only natural that NATO would have a strong interest in enhancing its contribution to maritime security.

*World-wide ship-borne trade has quadrupled in volume since 1965. In the Mediterranean Sea alone, some 5,000 merchant ships are at sea daily*

During the Cold War, regular patrols and periodic live exercises by NATO’s naval forces contributed to the general deterrence of maritime threats inside the NATO area. They also enabled the honing of the Alliance’s distinct skills in the planning and conduct of complex, multinational maritime operations. NATO also developed early patterns of civil-military cooperation for the wartime protection of shipping.

From July 1992 to October 1996, in a departure from the Cold War focus on collective defence,
NATO led UN-mandated maritime interdiction operations (MIO) in the Adriatic Sea to enforce economic sanctions against, as well as an embargo on all merchant traffic to and from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Starting in June 1993, NATO and the Western European Union merged their separate MIOs into a combined operation, Sharp Guard, with a unified command located at the headquarters of NATO’s Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe in Naples, Italy.

Since its initiation in October 2001, OAE forces have hailed over 88,000 ships, boarded more than 120 suspected ships and escorted nearly 500 merchant ships across the Strait of Gibraltar

Between 1992 and 1996, NATO and WEU forces challenged over 74,000 ships, boarded and inspected at sea nearly 6,000 and diverted for inspection in port nearly 1,500.

**NATO’s role in maritime security**

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Although a collective defence operation, OAE has been supported by several partner nations, notably the Russian Federation and Ukraine which contributed a warship each in 2006 and again in 2007, as well as Albania, Algeria, Georgia, Israel and Morocco.

In addition to MIOs under NATO command, allied navies also participate in coalition MIOs, such as Operation Enduring Freedom’s Combined Task Force 150. Since 2002, it has brought together maritime forces from 11 NATO and several other nations in an area of operations covering the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty the next day, NATO initiated a maritime counter-terrorism operation – Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) – aimed at deterring terrorist threats in the eastern Mediterranean. In March 2003, OAE was extended to include escorting merchant shipping in the Strait of Gibraltar and the following month NATO initiated compliant boarding operations undertaken with the consent of the flag state and the ship’s captain. In March 2004, OAE was expanded to the Mediterranean Sea as a whole and later that year OAE transitioned to an intelligence-driven operation focused on tracking and shadowing particular vessels of interest, allowing for a more effective and efficient use of assets. Although a collective defence operation, OAE has benefited from the support and cooperation of several Partner nations, including Albania, Croatia, Georgia, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, as well as Algeria, Israel and Morocco. In 2006 and again in 2007 Russia temporarily contributed temporarily a frigate and last year Ukrainian ships also joined OAE on two occasions. Since its initiation in October 2001, OAE forces have...
hailed over 81,000 ships, boarded more than 100 suspected ships and escorted nearly 500 ships.

Both Sharp Guard and Active Endeavour have been credited with disrupting criminal activities and networks. In both instances, success was dependent to a large extent on good cooperation and information exchange with civilian law enforcement agencies, such as the coast guard, border police and customs, as well as with commercial shipping companies. Cooperation with the former was the object of an experimental Joint Information Analysis Centre (JIAC) located in Naples, while cooperation with the latter happens routinely through the good offices of the NATO Shipping Centre at Northwood, UK, in consultation with the London-based International Maritime Organisation.

In recognition of the borderless nature of maritime risks and in a demonstration of the Alliance’s concern for securing exposed sea lanes of communication, last year a NATO multinational standing maritime group for the first time circumnavigated Africa for the first time. During this two-month long, 12,500 nautical mile deployment, the group patrolled the continent’s coastlines, conducted an exercise with the Republic of South Africa’s navy and rescued Yemeni military personnel threatened by a sudden volcanic eruption off Yemen’s coastline, demonstrating the ability of Alliance maritime forces to operate at a strategic distance from Europe.

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To build upon this extended operational experience, in 2004 NATO established a Maritime Interdiction
Operational Training Centre on the island of Crete, Greece. This Centre aims to promote an exchange of best practices, the development of doctrine, and the provision of training in the planning and conduct of MIOs among the Allies and with NATO’s partners. In addition, the NATO Military Authorities are developing a concept for maritime security operations, of which MIOs are a subset that addresses the range of NATO’s potential contributions to maritime security.

**A wider perspective on NATO’s roles in maritime security**

The growing need to ensure freedom of navigation and to protect Alliance shipping, territories and populations from a rising tide of mostly non-military seaborne risks militate for NATO assuming a specific and distinct role, complementary to the functions performed by national and international civilian law-enforcement agencies and maritime administrations.

While maritime security operations by nature address the range of seaborne risks, NATO should focus particularly on those tasks which require timely, high-grade intelligence and permanently-available capabilities and where NATO has particular interests and value to add: the protection of energy-related shipping and associated sea-based infrastructure; terrorism; and WMD proliferation.

Such a NATO role could revolve around the following core functions:

- the regular patrolling by NATO maritime forces of shipping lanes and choke points, particularly those routinely used by oil and gas tankers, as well as the surveillance of sea-based infrastructure, such as oil rigs and terminals;
• the planning and conduct of maritime security operations either led or supported by NATO, with a focus on complex MIOs requiring skilled and capable forces;
• the development of doctrine and civil-military, inter-agency cooperation arrangements, including legal aspects, to facilitate the interaction between naval headquarters and national and international civil agencies; and
• the provision of maritime situational awareness, involving surveillance, intelligence-gathering and information-exchange; in this function, NATO’s maritime headquarters at Naples and Northwood, as well as the NATO Shipping Centre, would play key roles, taking into account the lessons learned from the JIAC experiment, as well as work on achieving a NATO Network-Enabled Capability.

For these purposes, NATO can rely on its four standing maritime groups and on five on-call High Readiness Maritime Forces, as well as on expertise resident in its Planning Board for Ocean Shipping, Naval Armaments Group and other bodies.

In this endeavour, cooperation with NATO’s entire range of partners will be paramount, in order to reflect the ubiquity of maritime risks and to make them stake-holders in their mitigation. Maritime cooperation can be a particularly effective means to strengthen NATO’s partnerships with Russia and with Ukraine, as well as with the nations of the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). To this end, NATO should expand opportunities for the navies of these nations to participate in NATO exercises and attend maritime-oriented courses at NATO’s educational institutions. An increase in NATO port visits to MD and ICI countries and in local “passage exercises” (PASSEX) with their navies should also be considered.

**Bucharest and beyond**

The Bucharest Summit will take stock of progress in developing an Alliance maritime situational awareness capability.

This is a necessary step in establishing a baseline for a better structured NATO role in enhancing maritime security – including in regard to the maritime aspects of energy security – which draws on the Alliance’s well-established operational record and capabilities. Other steps beyond Bucharest should follow, reflecting the growing importance of maritime security as one of the defining security challenges of this century.

*Diego A. Ruiz Palmer* is Head of the Planning Section in NATO’s Operations Division.
As an innovative approach to building peace and security, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan were very much a response to unanticipated circumstances. They were largely new in structure, although elements of the PRT model were earlier seen in conflicts such as Vietnam.

The Bonn Agreement of December 2001 provided for the deployment in Afghanistan of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Given that Afghanistan lacked a credible national army or police force, ISAF was seen as essential to dealing with a looming security vacuum in rural areas.

Unfortunately, the politics of contributor countries undermined the Bonn strategy. This, and the logistical difficulties of deploying PRTs all over the large and distant Afghanistan, meant that ISAF was deployed just to Kabul. It was only after two years, and much lost momentum, that ISAF expansion beyond the capital was authorized by United Nations Resolution 1510 in October 2003.

It was during these two years, when ISAF expansion was blocked, that minds turned to other ways of establishing an international presence in the countryside: the PRTs became the device of choice. Ironically, their military components are now linked back to ISAF, which itself is under NATO command.

The task of replacing ISAF as a source of security was always a difficult one. But as time has gone by, one point has become increasingly clear – there is no single ‘PRT experience’. Instead, a range of factors

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**What is a PRT?**

‘Provincial Reconstruction Teams’ are small teams of military and civilian personnel working in Afghanistan’s provinces to provide security for aid works and help humanitarian assistance or reconstruction tasks in areas with ongoing conflict or high levels of insecurity.

**How many are there?**

There are 26 spread across many parts of Afghanistan, with 13 under Regional Command East, 5 under Regional Command North, 4 under Regional Command West, and 4 under Regional Command South.

**Which countries lead them?**

Some 14 different countries lead the PRTs, which comprise troops from 30 countries.

**When did the PRTs begin operating?**

In January 2003.
come into play which shape what PRTs can achieve, and in what ways.

First, PRTs vary according to location, and the specific security and development needs in a particular area. The experience of the New Zealand PRT in Bamian has been very different from that of the Canadians in Kandahar.

Bamian province is geographically encapsulated, relatively ethnically homogeneous, and well run by a local administration where Afghanistan’s only female governor enjoys strong community support. This relatively low-threat environment means the PRT has successfully provided ambient security and has largely avoided being drawn into activities which are properly those of the Afghan authorities.

In Kandahar, by contrast, the population and the PRT are exposed to attacks by Taliban militants reportedly operating from safe havens in Pakistan. The local administration has had a very patchy record of achievement. And local politics is marked by intense rivalries between different forces aspiring to power.

As a result, the Kandahar deployment has proved far more difficult to manage than that in Bamian. This is reflected in the relative casualty rates. More than 70 Canadian soldiers have been killed. New Zealand’s deployment has not seen a single death from hostile attack.

Second, PRTs vary according to the practices and military cultures of contributing states. The problem of ‘national caveats’ on the ways in which forces might be used has long been a serious concern for commanders in Afghanistan. These caveats reflect significant differences in the world-views of contributing states. They are manifested in both their militaries’ organizational cultures, and in what they see as appropriate roles for their PRTs.

For example, some militaries are committed to using kinetic force to establish a credible, robust presence. For others, this might reflect both a failure of imagination and a reluctance to use negotiation as a way of achieving concrete objectives.

But even within a single state PRT, a change of leadership can significantly affect how a PRT operates. Individual PRT commanders bring different levels of knowledge of the Afghan environment and different understandings of what the task of the PRT should be. Some throw themselves with gusto into the experience – others wish to get out of the country as quickly as possible.

A good PRT leadership strategy is to spend as much time as possible listening, rather than talking.

This map shows a selection of the activities PRTs have been performing around Afghanistan. You can find more information on these and other projects online at: www.nato.int/buc2008/exhibit.html
Third, PRTs vary according to how effectively they engage with local leaderships and populations. Successful PRTs need to bring positive change in their environments. Even if well-run, a PRT will have done little to foster continuous reconstruction if it does not lay the foundation for stable local development.

In rural Afghanistan, personal ties tend to shape people’s behaviour more than links between formal organizations. This benefits PRTs which can leave personnel in place for longer periods, as they can cultivate these kinds of informal ties.

By now it is a common place observation that development of this kind requires serious engagement between outside actors and internal forces. Again, there is quite a degree of variety. In rural Afghanistan, personal ties tend to shape people’s behaviour more than links between formal organizations. This benefits PRTs which can leave personnel in place for longer periods, as they can cultivate these kinds of informal ties.

It also helps PRTs who have staff with relevant language skills. PRTs operating in the north, where Persian is more widely used, have an advantage over those in the south where Pashto is more common: Persian is relatively easy to learn, whereas Pushtu is exceptionally difficult.

There are further coordination complications arising from the nature of the PRTs’ tasks. For example, PRT leaderships tend to be much closer to provincial administrations than to the central authorities. This can create problems when provincial administrations are not fully attuned to the central government’s priorities — particularly as strategic reconstruction priorities are formally set through consultation between donors and the Afghan government.

PRTs can also be more interested in their home government’s priorities than those of the Afghan government. It is tempting for PRTs to meet local (and donor) needs through ‘Quick Impact Projects’, and these can on occasion be beneficial, especially if they have been carefully devised with locals. But unfortunately, some of these projects can also prove to be costly, unsustainable white elephants, and reflect a lack of understanding of the complexities of Afghanistan’s diverse micro-societies.

‘Development’ is not simply a set of projects; it involves capacity-building, sustainability strategies, and above all an understanding of how societies operate. The most successful PRTs have been those that are best attuned to recognizing Afghans’ conceptions of Afghans’ needs. A good PRT leadership strategy is to spend as much time as possible listening, rather than talking.

This has led to tensions on the ground between some PRTs and experienced NGOs (Non-governmental organizations), which tend to approach reconstruction...
Within PRTs, too, there can be tensions between military and civilian components. These can have either positive and creative or negative and destructive consequences, depending on how they are handled.

There is one final issue which is as yet not much discussed: what processes should be put in place to manage a transition to local ownership of PRT activity? The Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police will eventually have to take over some security responsibilities which PRTs are handling, but as yet there is no clear timetable or template to govern such a transition.

Afghanistan cannot confidently assume that the current pattern of PRT deployment will be sustained for more than the short-to-medium term. Ultimately, it will be domestic politics in contributing countries, rather than the needs of Afghanistan, that will shape the transition.

And if casualties climb, international commitment to running PRTs may decline. For this reason, Kabul would be wise to begin thinking now about how to handle such a situation – no matter how distant it may be.

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Facts and faces of emerging security risks

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With the Cold War a distant memory and the warming of the planet a growing reality, it is time to reassess what constitute major security threats. These photos give a brief insight into how today’s threats may change tomorrow’s world.

Water use has increased sixfold during the 20th century – twice the rate of population growth. Secure sources of water will be ‘potent fuel for war’
— United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon

Desertification already affects up to 200 million people. Climate change means that within 10 years, it could drive 50 million more people from their homes
— United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
The percentage of ocean covered by ice is shrinking by 8 percent per decade. Within about 60 years, there will be no summer ice at all on the Arctic ocean.

— The United States National Snow and Ice Data Center

“There has been increasing interest by terrorists in acquiring nuclear weapons. I cannot say 100 percent that it hasn’t happened already.” — Mohamed ElBaradei,

Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 2005
International cyber spying is the single biggest threat for enterprise in 2008. Cybercrime is no longer just a threat to industry and individuals, but increasingly to national security. – McAfee
Virtual Criminology Report 2007 (with input from NATO).

Energy has already been at the root of several conflicts. And the International Energy Agency predicts a rise in global energy demand of between 50 and 60 percent by 2030.
In the 1990s, NATO’s new partnerships were a key component of the Alliance’s reinvention for the post-Cold War era. NATO enlargement and intervention in the Balkans were in many ways the biggest new strategic steps the Alliance took.

The development of new partnerships tools nonetheless helped prevent the emergence of new dividing lines in the wake of enlargement, allowed NATO to build relationship with countries that were strategically important but not candidates for membership, and facilitated the putting together of the NATO-led coalition that helped keep peace in the Balkans. Partnerships were therefore a critical part of NATO’s success in the 1990s and the grand strategy of projecting stability across the continent.

In hindsight, these new partnership tools may look like a common sense adjustment to a new strategic reality. At the time it was not easy, however, for the Alliance to open itself to and engage with non-members.

Alliance members today are unsure and divided over a future common purpose and strategy for NATO

Many of us remember only too well being looked at askance when we suggested such steps in the early 1990s. It simply couldn’t be done, I was repeatedly told on visits to NATO headquarters. A few years later, NATO developed the Partnership for Peace and subsequently the NATO-Russia Founding Act, the NATO-Ukraine Council and the EAPC (Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council). I recall this story only to underscore the point that it is when – and only when – the strategic imperative and the political consensus to change became clear that the seemingly impossible melted away and the Alliance proved quite flexible and innovative.

Today we are in an analogous situation. Alliance members today are unsure and divided over a future common purpose and strategy for NATO. Many of the new strategic challenges we face lie beyond Europe and entail engagement in potentially unstable regions of the world where the Alliance has never trodden. But we won’t, in my view, solve the issue of what a new generation of partnerships should be about until we reach greater clarity on these broader strategic questions. There are three in particular we need to address.

The first is the future role of NATO partnerships within the current Euro-Atlantic community. There is a growing sense that these partnership and structures are becoming obsolete. Many of the more committed EAPC members have either joined the Alliance or are focused on bilateral partnerships via MAP (Membership Action Plan) and similar instruments.

The result is that EAPC is being hollowed out from within. As Russia becomes more assertive and anti-Western, it may be less cooperative as well. Central Asia is becoming more important to the West statically but no one knows how to use NATO partnership tools as part of a broader engagement strategy. Again, the problem is the absence of an overall Western strategy of which a NATO partnership tool could be a critical part.

The second question is the future role of NATO in the wider Middle East. NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) are in a state of strategic limbo. The two initiatives are, of course, very different in their origins. The MD was developed in the mid-1990s as a complement and balance to NATO’s opening to the East. It has always been a kind of weaker sister to enlargement and partnership – with less strategic drive from the Alliance and less enthusiastic Partners on the other side. The ICI, launched in Istanbul in the wake of September 11th and Iraq war, was a first step in NATO recognizing the West’s enormous stakes in the Persian Gulf.
Today, both initiatives suffer from the same lack of strategic clarity in NATO over our objectives in the wider Middle East. They are mechanisms bereft of an overall vision or strategy. There are countries in the wider Middle East seeking closer ties with NATO and where the Alliance is the brake. The list starts with Israel but includes other Mediterranean countries as well as members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Here, too, NATO has not been able to capitalize on these strategic openings, given the absence of a broader and shared Western vision and strategy.

The third key strategic issue is possible future global partnerships. Here the Alliance’s official use of the term “contact countries” is already indicative of ambivalence. Operations like Afghanistan require NATO to attract non-European contributors for burden-sharing reasons. And when such countries contribute more than many NATO allies, they understandably want to be at the decision-making table. This requires opening up NATO decision-making in new ways.

Here, too, we find the unanswered issue of what NATO members really want. Are partnerships with Australia or Japan really just about squeezing more troops and money out of them for NATO-led missions? Or should they also be about building strategic relationships in new and important regions? Is it a one-way or two-way street? Simply put, is this a burden-sharing exercise or are we trying to shape new security dynamics in important regions? NATO cannot and should not go everywhere to try to solve all problems. But one trip to Japan or Australia rapidly reveals that these countries are reaching out to NATO for more interesting if complicated reasons often ignored in our current debate.

What should one conclude from all of this? The Alliance is again at a strategic crossroads. Having reinvented itself in the 1990s to address the challenge of building a new post-Cold War order in Europe, it now faces the need to re-reinvent itself into a security actor capable of defending its members’ values and interests on a more global stage. NATO has taken that strategic leap in principle with Afghanistan, but whether it will succeed is not yet clear. ISAF’s success there would open the door to new and more ambitious thinking about partnerships and a possible broader role in South Asian security and beyond. Failure could call into question the future of the Alliance.

You don’t have to be Clausewitz to predict that crises like Afghanistan are not likely to be a one time event. It is also a reasonably safe bet that the next one will be in the wider Middle East. If the future of this region is truly the primary strategic issue of our time, then it is certainly an anomaly that the premier Western alliance is almost nowhere to be found when it comes to addressing it because of the lack of any common grand strategy that NATO could be part of. Closer to home the challenge of redefining of partnership for Eurasia may seem less daunting but here too there are real issues.

If one poses these questions today in Brussels, one is often met with an awkward silence – just like in the very early 1990s. Partnerships once again seem to belong to the ‘too hard to handle’ category. In reality, the requirement to creatively rethink partnership as a new tool for the world in which we live is greater than ever. The problem we need to resolve is finding the common purpose and political will to decide what we want to achieve strategically. Then there will be enough smart people at NATO that will help us modernize our arsenal of partnerships to help achieve those goals.

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The nuclear dimensions of jihadist terrorism

Suicide bombings are bad enough. But suicide nuclear bombs would spell catastrophe. Michael Rühle looks at how jihadists’ attempts to join the nuclear club have been thwarted – and what’s needed in staving off this threat.

It may run counter to common wisdom, but the jihadist terrorist threat to Western societies remains marginal. The number of casualties inflicted by terrorist acts remains low, and the economic damage caused by terrorist acts or, indirectly, by enhanced spending on security efforts, can be absorbed by national economies with relative ease.

The ideological appeal of jihadist terrorism is as weak as ever, and even in most parts of the Muslim world, radical Islam remains deeply unpopular. Jihadist terrorism can instil fear and cause serious disruptions within Western societies. Yet despite worrisome headlines about car bombs in London, suicide attacks in Iraq, and heavy fighting between NATO forces and Taliban in Afghanistan, jihadist terrorists are nowhere near any kind of victory.

But how realistic is such a scenario? The fact that various terrorist groups have been seeking to acquire nuclear material and know-how is well documented; but could terrorists plausibly acquire or even build a nuclear device?

Equally importantly, how would a ‘nuclear 9/11’ square with Islam, a religion that prohibits the killing of innocents? Finally, given some terrorists’ obvious quest for the nuclear option, why has such an attack not yet happened?

Striving for the bomb

Nuclear terrorism can have many faces. The simplest option would be the release of radioactive material in densely populated areas.

In 1987, near the Brazilian city of Goiania, some scrap metal scavengers broke into an abandoned radiological hospital and removed a container with highly radioactive caesium. In the weeks that followed, several people died, many more suffered serious health problems, and several contaminated buildings had to be dismantled.

The Goiania incident was an accident, not a terrorist act. But it indicates what could happen if terrorists had radioactive material at their disposal. Given the significant amount of such material that has gone missing...
from hospitals, power plants, etc, some experts believe that certain terrorist groups may already possess enough of it to stage an attack of that kind.

Another plausible option would be an attack on a nuclear power plant. Since 1972, when the hijackers of a United States (US) passenger plane threatened to crash the airliner into a nuclear reactor in Tennessee, this scenario has acquired considerable credibility. And 9/11 further highlighted this risk.

Another scenario is the use of a so-called radiological ‘dirty bomb’, in which non-fissile but highly radioactive material is mixed with a conventional explosive, such as TNT. The detonation disperses the radioactive material, causing relatively few casualties, but contaminating wide areas. If such a bomb was exploded in a major city, the long-term radiation effects would make entire parts of that city uninhabitable, causing enormous economic damage. For this reason, the radiological bomb has been labelled a “weapon of mass disruption” rather than mass destruction.

The design challenges of such a device are considered to be modest. Moreover, in March 2002 US authorities arrested a man suspected of working on such designs for al Qaida. And in November 2007 Slovak authorities seized uranium powder that was enriched enough for use in a radiological bomb.

All this has led many experts to conclude that for those bent on waging ‘nuclear jihad’, the ‘dirty bomb’ could well be the most readily accessible option.

And what about the ‘real’ nuclear bomb?

Tabloid articles about building a nuclear device from blueprints available on the internet are way off the mark. Up to now, the capability to build a nuclear device has been widely believed to rest with state actors only. The elaborate technical infrastructure required is simply not available to non-state actors, no matter how much money they might have at their disposal. Thus, even though al Qaida may have recruited several experienced nuclear physicists, it remains doubtful whether they could build a fission bomb.

Even if terrorists were to obtain a fully fledged weapon, they would have to overcome its secure command and control features. Moreover, it appears that some of al Qaida’s attempts to obtain nuclear material on the ‘black market’ failed precisely because the customers’ limited nuclear expertise made them easy victims for swindlers.

Such difficulties might be overcome, however, if terrorists could acquire a functional nuclear weapon from a like-minded regime. This scenario may strike many observers as highly unlikely, yet it can no longer be entirely dismissed. Cash-strapped North Korea hinted that it might consider the sale of nuclear-capable missiles a legitimate source of income.

And 2004 reports about the commercial nuclear smuggling network run by the entrepreneurial Pakistani metallurgist A.Q. Khan revealed the existence of a secret market, unconstrained by political or ideological inhibitions. Khan reportedly supplied Libya, North Korea, Iran and other customers with weapons designs and components rather than fully fledged weapon systems, yet future dealers might go even further.

... for those bent on waging ‘nuclear jihad’, the ‘dirty bomb’ could well be the most readily accessible option...
Finally, the debate about a possible ‘Talibanization’ of Pakistan, where religious radicals might take over the state and its nuclear arsenal, has raised the spectre of a jihadist nuclear power.

Breaking down the barriers to violence

Terrorist groups such as al Qaida claim to act in the name of Islam. As this religion lacks any authoritative expositor of doctrine, it is subject to a wide range of different – sometimes outright contradictory – interpretations by individual scholars and clergymen.

That said, however, it has been widely understood that, not unlike Christian’s ‘just war’ doctrine, Islam does not allow for indiscriminate attacks on civilians. Accordingly, many religious references by Osama bin Laden, for example his 1998 statement that acquiring nuclear and chemical weapons was a “religious duty” for Muslims, may appear like entirely self-serving interpretations of Islam, intended solely for justifying personal aims.

It would be a mistake, however, to dismiss such statements as mere religious window-dressing. For many years certain radical clerics have been reinterpreting this religion with the obvious aim of tearing down its inherent moral and legal barriers to indiscriminate violence.

A first significant step in this reinterpretation already occurred in the 1980s with the suicide attack on the US Marine barracks in Lebanon and the upsurge in Palestinian suicide bombings. While Islam does not approve of suicide, and thus implicitly opposes suicide bombings, numerous clerics started to argue that suicide bombers were actually “martyrs” and acting in accordance with God’s aims. In this interpretation, even the killing of innocent fellow Muslims can be tolerated, for they become martyrs themselves.

This tendency to glorify suicide bombing by re-branding the perpetrators has extended far beyond the Israeli-Palestinian context. If killing innocent Israelis is permissible because Israel is occupying Palestine, the United States, whose soldiers are deployed in several Muslim countries, can be subjected to similar reprisals. Such was the logic of Osama bin Laden in justifying his attack on the US on ‘9/11’. Moreover, because Americans collectively elect their leadership, the entire US population could be held responsible for the sins of its government.

In his 2003 work, ‘A Treatise on the Law of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Against the Unbelievers’, one Saudi radical scholar argued that since roughly ten million Muslims had been killed by Americans, killing that same number of Americans was permissible, including through the use of weapons of mass destruction.

Such a fatwa (an Islamic scholar’s or clergyman’s analysis on interpreting Islamic law) effectively provides a religious blank cheque for mass murder. Against this backdrop, statements by some Islamists, including religiously fervent physicists who maintain that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons ‘belong to all Muslims’, acquire a new, worrying significance.

Explaining terrorist nuclear abstinence

If al Qaida and other terrorist groups are still making significant efforts to acquire nuclear materials, and if the religious justification for nuclear terrorism seems to have become more explicit within certain strands of Islamist fundamentalism, why has this kind of attack not yet been conducted? There are several possible explanations.

The most straightforward explanation centres on the immense technical difficulties of orchestrating such an attack. In this view, al Qaida simply has been unable to master the technical challenges involved in such a plot. As of today, no state appears to have supplied al Qaida with the elaborate infrastructure necessary to ‘go nuclear’, let alone any fully working devices.

Another view holds that the enormous loss of life caused by such an attack would undermine rather than advance the terrorists’ cause. According to this view, a terrorist act of such a scale would alienate large segments of al Qaida’s own constituency, which
accepts terrorist methods in principle, yet would not condone the wanton destruction of a ‘nuclear 9/11’.

A third explanation is that some of al Qaida’s efforts may have been disrupted through counter-terrorism efforts. Indeed, it appears that since ‘9/11’ several planned attacks involving the use of weapons of mass destruction have been thwarted.

Moreover, the international intervention in Afghanistan has effectively denied al Qaida its major home base and has forced it to disperse, thereby making any concerted planning of a nuclear attack far more difficult. The national and collective measures taken by many governments, such as intelligence cooperation, enhanced container security, uncovering nuclear smuggling networks, securing ‘loose nukes’ from the former Soviet Union, and draining terrorist financing networks, may have further degraded the ability of terrorists to launch a nuclear attack.

Yet another reason might be deterrence. While much has been made of the claim that suicidal terrorists can not be deterred, states that sponsor terrorism are likely to remain susceptible to threats of retaliation. Since terrorist cells require territory on which to train and from which to operate, a threat against any country willing to serve as a ‘host’ might have a restraining influence on the kinds of activities it may allow its ‘guests’ to undertake.

This connection between non-state and state actors lies at the heart of French, British and US statements about the role of their nuclear forces in deterring state-sponsored terrorism. Coupled with improved ‘nuclear forensics’, i.e. the technical ability to trace an attack back to its sources, such statements may indeed have a deterrence value against states that provide a safe haven for terrorists.

**What’s needed now…**

The ongoing efforts by jihadist terrorists to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear and radiological weapons, continue to be among the key challenges to Western security.

While the terrorist use of a nuclear bomb remains unlikely due to serious technical obstacles, and while international cooperation on counter-terrorism and non-proliferation may have made acts of nuclear terrorism more difficult to carry out, the use of a radiological ‘dirty bomb’ is an eventuality that Western societies need to be prepared for.

Above all, this may require greater investments in national and international capabilities for detecting the traffic of certain materials as well as for alleviating the consequences of an attack.

*The national and collective measures taken by many governments, such as intelligence cooperation, enhanced container security, uncovering nuclear smuggling networks, securing ‘loose nukes’ from the former Soviet Union, and draining terrorist financing networks, may have further degraded the ability of terrorists to launch a nuclear attack.*

Equally worrisome are tendencies among radical Muslim clerics to propound interpretations of Islam that justify the use of weapons of mass destruction against civilians. However, arresting these fateful tendencies by denying jihadist terrorists their religious justifications is a challenge that cannot be met primarily by the West. Speaking out and acting against this brutalisation of Islam is first and foremost a challenge for Islam itself.

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Healthy firms reinvent themselves every few years. Without innovation, they lose market power and become irrelevant.

That is why NATO needs policy entrepreneurs who are willing to give the Alliance a new lease of life and a new focus. Today, there is hardly a challenge facing the West that NATO has not been obliged to add to its already crowded agenda. On top of traditional tasks such as territorial defence and peacekeeping, the Alliance now deals with weapons of mass destruction proliferation, missile defence and cyber-security.

In its multifunctionality, NATO begins to resemble a Swiss pocket-knife with all its tools exposed. But as we all know, unfolded pocket-knives are unwieldy affairs, and whilst prepared to do everything, are actually good at nothing. This is why NATO needs to retool itself, starting with a revision of its outdated strategic concept.

The “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” mentality underestimates the strategic challenges facing NATO today

The current strategic concept, which is the core mission statement of the Alliance, was adopted in April 1999, in the midst of NATO’s Kosovo campaign. This key document therefore predates the strategic paradigm shift of 9/11, as well as NATO’s Afghanistan mission, the first outside the Euro-Atlantic area.

In the past, allies have not prepared strategic concepts frequently (in 1952, 1967, 1991 and 1999), but history seems to go at fast-forward speed these days. This is why NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer called for a new strategic concept in February 2007, arguing that on-going operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo have offered the Alliance “lessons of 21st century security. We need to enshrine them in our guiding documents so that they are implemented in practice.”

However, many officials in NATO capitals are concerned that the risks of such a strategic review are too great. They fear that it might revive the transatlantic controversies of 2002-3, and open wounds that have just begun to heal. They also suggest that with the Comprehensive Political Guidance document that was endorsed in November 2006 at the Riga Summit, a solution has been found to NATO’s predicament.

Still, merely kicking the can down the road would be a serious mistake. This “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it”-mentality underestimates the strategic challenges facing NATO today.

In the current debate, German chancellor Angela Merkel is the only political leader who has clearly stated she would like to see a new strategic concept endorsed at NATO’s Summit in 2009. This will be difficult to achieve given the electoral calendar in the United States where a new administration will take office in January 2009, and will need several months to get a new team together.

Presenting a new strategic concept at NATO’s 60th anniversary would be a welcome birthday present. But more important than nice timing is that at NATO’s Summit in Bucharest, allies commit themselves to biting the bullet and doing what is necessary: accept the inconveniences of temporary disagreements and aim for a new NATO strategic concept that clarifies the Alliance’s political and military strategy - and communicates this clearly to the wider world.

Why? And why now?

The current debate about a new strategic concept is déjà vu to strategic analysts: all arguments, pro and con, which could be heard in the 1990s, are now replayed. Why open Pandora’s Box? Why waste diplomatic energy that could be spent on more important, operational matters? Why risk failure by washing NATO’s dirty linen in public?

Interestingly, both the 1991 and 1999 strategic concepts were innovative and instrumental in getting
NATO ready for new members and missions. So recent experience does not support a cautious approach, but rather suggests that a more daring spirit serves the Alliance well.

Arguably, NATO is facing a litmus test which determines whether the organization is really still an “Alliance”, based on shared interests and values, or merely a glorified security coalition. There are four pressing reasons why a strategic recalibration of NATO is required.

First, allies need to find a workable consensus about the legitimacy of using military force in non-Article 5 operations (i.e., for purposes other than self-defence), in extreme cases, even without an explicit UN Security Council mandate. In a way, this has been the most controversial, unresolved issue of the 1999 strategic concept, which has gained even greater relevance with the US invasion of Iraq and the American doctrine of preventive wars.

If NATO aspires to deal with terrorism and WMD proliferation, the timing and legitimacy of military force will be a key issue on which the allies have to see eye to eye. But as a look at some core strategic documents shows, this is not the case today. The EU Security Strategy of 2003 opens with the sanguine observation that “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure, nor so free”, whereas the US Security Strategy of 2006 starts with the ominous statement that “America is at war.” This testifies to the potential of infecting the Alliance with a level of strategic schizophrenia that is unhealthy and untenable.

The current ostrich-reflex, with the head in the sand in the hope that the problem will go away, will no longer do. A commitment must be made to turn NATO into a true, functioning political organisation, prepared to debate key strategic challenges facing the Alliance. That this is not happening today explains the diverging threat perceptions which make collective NATO-action problematic. The North Atlantic Council (NAC), NATO’s key political governing body, now focuses its deliberations largely on the Alliance’s on-going operations, with too little time spent on potential crises lurking over the horizon. A new strategic concept should bring an end to this imbalance, for example by changing procedures for agenda-setting within the NAC.

Second, choices must be made regarding NATO’s future as a defence organisation. Obviously, collective defence remains the backbone of the Alliance. But what does this mean in an era where energy cut-offs and (cyber-)terrorism are the preferred lines of attack? NATO’s collective defence clause under Article 5 was duly invoked after 9/11, which means in theory that NATO as a whole remains in a quasi-state of war. The fact that we simply forget this indicates that the Alliance needs to rethink the nature of collective defence, its responses, and the importance of retooling its operational kit to address new security challenges more effectively. NATO’s military operations suggest a new strategy of “forward defence”, where allied interests and values are protected “at the Hindukush.” But with energy security topping the agenda and relations with Russia at freezing point, the true, and possibly novel, meaning of Article 5 requires serious collective thought.

All this implies that NATO has to set priorities. The expectations–capabilities gap of the Alliance is becoming dangerously large. As an organisation, NATO cannot bring many policy tools to the table and depends on member states’ willingness to work together and pool their collective resources and capabilities. But the continuing acrimony over funding and force generation for NATO-led operations exposes the crumbling consensus within the Alliance, especially in the case of ISAF.

NATO should begin to cut its coat according to its cloth. The new strategic concept should clearly explain what Article 5 means in the 21st century, and, based on that new assessment, set limits to the scope and nature of NATO-led missions.

Third, NATO should bring its relationship with new, often global partners and key players like the
EU and UN on a new level. In Afghanistan, ISAF includes crucial allies such as Australia, whose 1000 soldiers are engaged in the country’s risky southern province of Uruzgan. Since numerous NATO member states remain reluctant to risk life and limb in these dangerous missions, the Alliance risks becoming a “coalition of the willing”, which would undermine internal solidarity, and hence NATO’s raison d’être. If NATO chooses to go truly global, it must draw global partners closer to the organization, and clarify their rights and obligations under new and transparent rules of the game.

This also applies to NATO’s ties with the EU and UN. The Alliance takes pride in the “comprehensive approach” it takes towards operations. In reality, however, this can only be realized by bringing the resources of key international organisations (IOs) such as the EU, UN, and World Bank into play. This is why these IOs were invited for the first time to discuss the reconstruction of Afghanistan during NATO’s informal meeting of defence ministers in Noordwijk, in October 2007. Since 21 EU states are also members of NATO, more coordination and joint action between both organisations is obviously required.

The Berlin-Plus arrangement foresaw the EU using NATO resources. Now it is time for a so-called Berlin-Plus in reverse, as the Alliance may want to draw upon EU tools like the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF), as well as the EU’s civilian crisis management capabilities. Since the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) now has 90,000 troops deployed under its authority (based on a US$ 5 billion annual budget), NATO-UN ties obviously need to be strengthened and formalized. Numerous modalities are informally discussed, but choices have to be made urgently.

Fourth, confronting NATO’s strategic choices and dilemmas head-on will have a cleansing effect within the Alliance.

Those who fear that the road towards a new strategic concept will be paved with conflict and mutual recrimination are only partly right. The main problem with NATO is that maintaining the status quo is more risky than reform—muddling through is the clearest sign of failure. Today some key NATO players worry about bringing their different perspectives together in one new strategic concept. Some want to be a truly global NATO; others fear this could detract from the construction of a strong European approach.

It will no doubt be difficult to square this circle, but NATO owes it to itself to give it a serious try. Although the main prize should be an innovative and activist strategic concept, for NATO the process of generating consensus may be as valuable as the end result itself. Perhaps the Alliance should take courage, and take a leaf from the EU’s book, whose recent constitutional crisis has had a cathartic effect on the process of European integration, rather than stopping it.

Madonna or die?

The quality of adapting to new tasks whilst staying true to one’s own principles is something which business analysts qualify as the Madonna-curve. This curve is named after the legendary pop-diva who reinvented herself each time her style and stardom went into inevitable decline, but whose audacity has lifted her up to ever higher levels of relevance and fame.

NATO should follow the Madonna-curve, and not wait till its controversies escalate into public wrangles. The argument that tinkering on the edges will do since all challenges can be dealt with one at a time simply does not hold. To be successful, NATO needs a package deal of painful compromises, where each member state has to give and take. This requires a comprehensive reform effort which only a new strategic concept offers.

There is no perfect time for a strategic extreme make-over of the Alliance. So today is as good a time as any.

Remember that the present strategic concept dates from 1999, when NATO was conducting the first fighting war in its history. This should give the Alliance the required confidence that they can pull it off this time as well, especially since the only alternative to the Madonna-curve seems a steady decline in relevance and merit.

Lest we forget, the rest of the world carefully scrutinizes NATO’s actions, and some obviously long for an Alliance immobilized by disorientation and rigidity. A new and ground-breaking strategic concept would prove NATO’s critics wrong and assure the long-term strength of the Alliance.

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Green issues – red alert?

NATO Review Editor Paul King interviews Dr Pachauri, the Chairman of the Nobel Peace Prize winning IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) about the links between the environment and security.

Paul King, NATO Review Editor: My first question is about the Nobel Peace Prize. Can you tell me what it means to you personally, and also in terms of the message it sends out?

Dr Pachauri: Well, to me personally, of course, it’s a source of pride. One feels very good, but of course, the award is meant for the entire IPCC community and the governments who take decisions for the IPCC. I think it also sends out a very important message that climate change has very important relationships with various elements of peace, and that we need to start focusing on this issue. I think the nexus between what climate change can do in terms of impacts on peace and stability and security across the globe is something that needs to be highlighted now on the basis of the message that you get from this award.

NR: Do you think that the possible effects of future climate change, such as increased competition for resources, land, water, means that security needs to be redefined?

PACHAURI: Yes, I think so, because security is not just sending in troops to some place or the other. I think firstly we have to be intellectually much more rigorous in understanding the drivers of security or the threats to security, and that certainly is an ongoing effort that has to be mounted on a large scale.

The fact that Russia planted a flag under the North Pole is only symbolic of this enormous competition to get there first. And that certainly could be a threat to security in some form or the other. And this, in a way, will also distort politics across the globe. You’ll find that those agents and organizations that are able to help countries and societies in providing access to resources will be favoured, will be supported – even if they’re repressive regimes, even if they violate the very basic principles on which democracy and all the freedoms that we value are based on. I think there’s a new set of issues that need to be carefully highlighted and understood if we are talking about security.

NR: How high would you say that the possibility of climate change leading to a major armed conflict is? And what do you think would lead to that conflict? For example, water, oil, etc?

PACHAURI: Yes, I think one reason for such conflict would be competition for scarce resources. Water is certainly one of them. It could be hydrocarbon

Dr Rajendra Pachauri, chairman of the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), collected the Nobel Peace Prize on behalf of the IPCC in December 2007. The award was shared with former US Vice President Al Gore. Dr Pachauri is an economist and environmental scientist. He is currently the director general of the Tata Energy Research Institute in India. He has previously held positions on the board of the Indian Oil Corporation, been an advisor to the Prime Minister of India and lectured at Yale University. The IPCC was set up to understand the scientific basis of risk of human-induced climate change, its potential impacts and options for adaptation and mitigation. It is widely regarded as the leading source of information about climate change and its effects.

I think there's a new set of issues that need to be carefully highlighted and understood if we are talking about security
resources. There could be problems of let's say a decline in agricultural yields which leads to deprivation in terms of nutrition and food. And a whole range of catastrophes and natural disasters, which would get exacerbated with the impacts of climate change.

Now, essentially all of this means that there is the danger of larger and larger numbers of people moving from wherever they're settled to other areas. And when you start seeing this kind of a trend then clearly you have the inbuilt element of conflict. And I would imagine this is likely to grow to a large extent.

For instance, in the IPCC Synthesis Report we estimated that by 2020, in Africa alone, there would be something like 75 to 250 million people who would be suffering from growing water scarcity. And therefore, what are they going to do? They're going to move around. There will be conflict. Even among communities for limited water resources. And this can multiply on a large scale in several parts of the world.

Agreements and understanding in the past have worked because we probably haven't reached a tipping point. I mean, we've been able to manage even limited and depleting resources in a manner that generally gives enough to everybody. But I'm not too sure whether we can rely on that situation continuing in the future.

NR: Environmental challenges are obviously global, but that they will affect poorer areas of the world far worse. Do you think that in terms of the division of the world by borders, that these borders will become more or less important with the climate change?

PACHAURI: Well, it's a very complex question. On the one hand the climate factors that are going to lead to a threat to security and stability don't respect borders at all. On the other hand I think the response to this might actually mean defining those borders in a much more rigid sense, and perhaps protecting them with much more, let's say, proactive efforts.

I think our laws and agreements clearly define borders and there really shouldn't be too much scope for doubt on that. But the interpretation of these agreements will, of course, be subject to a lot of controversy and there would be those who would like to use those definitions in their favour. So I think the fact that threats to security and peace as a result of climate change are going to go beyond borders, would require, or at least impel, several governments and
societies to define those borders in a manner that gives them an advantage over others.

So you'll probably see many more disputes coming up and therefore a fair amount of danger, I would say, to security in some of these areas where borders could be somewhat nebulous in people's understanding, even though the agreements are fairly clear.

NR: The challenges will require an increasing degree of either trust or cooperation. Where do you see the role of major international organizations, such as the UN, such as NATO, in building this trust and cooperation?

PACHAURI: I really think they'll become increasingly important, simply because these are issues that a country or a group of countries are not going to be able to solve. You really need a totally different global compact. You need global initiatives that are able to define these problems and are able to find multilateral solutions for them. I would say an organization like the UN probably needs to redefine its role and perhaps even restructure its organization.

NR: With major environmental disasters and events that have already happened, NATO has already played a role, notably in Hurricane Katrina and the earthquake in Pakistan. Do you think that this role will be increasingly demanded as this kind of event increases in number?

PACHAURI: Yes, I should think so, and I imagine NATO in its own interests and in keeping with its overall objectives, should start anticipating some of these events, and some of these possibilities. Which means that it would have to carry out much deeper research, much greater intellectual introspection of how things are shaping up in different parts of the world.

NATO, after all, came into existence when the Cold War was on, and that rationale is gone now, and

I would say an organization like the UN probably needs to redefine its role and perhaps even restructure its organization

I think, given the fact that it is an organization which has enormous strengths, with the inputs of a large number of extremely important countries, I think it has to redefine its role. And I would imagine that it should be driven by a much greater study of what is likely to happen in the future, than to be caught unawares.

And if that's the case, NATO certainly can play an extremely important role in preventing or managing some of these threats and problems.

NR: And in terms of prevention what would you recommend?

PACHAURI: Well, it seems to me, and I've been feeling this for a while, that an organization like NATO needs to work much more closely with civil society, with organizations that have their ear on the ground, that have some support at the grassroots level. And this would not only help NATO to get feedback on what's happening over there, but also in the event of possible crisis or conflict, mobilize some of these organizations as allies.

So I think it has to reach out. It has to get out of the military operation type of mode. I think there is much more to prevention of these conflicts than just moving in there when the conflict has actually occurred.

Which raises another important fact that, I think, organizations like NATO need much greater coordination with the intelligence agencies and perhaps not only relying on the conventional intelligence agencies, but maybe developing some new linkages in areas that they expect are going to become hotspots.

NR: How do you balance the developing world's drive for development and the increasing stability development can bring to societies, against the effects on the climate of this development and the instability that climate change can bring? Do you think that security in the latter part of the 21st Century will be less about personal wealth and more about a sustainable quality of life?

PACHAURI: Absolutely, and this also means that some of the huge disparities that we have currently, both across societies and within societies, will need to lessen, and I think we'll have to understand that that's an extremely important objective of development. Development that only allows a very small section of society to prosper and a large number of people to be left out of that whole system is clearly not development.

It was Kenneth Boulding, an economist who I greatly admire, who said more than a quarter century ago that it's unlikely that 200 years ago the difference between the richest societies and the poorest was more than one is to five, and he says today it's more than one is to 50.

So, the trend that this world has been going on blindly, without paying any attention to these issues, in my view, is suicidal. We have to stop this.

NR: Can I ask you about governments versus non-state actors. In some developed countries, it is
actually the population who is more radical, in terms of addressing climate change than governments. So how do you see the balance between governments and non-state actors in the future?

PACHAURI: Well, I think by and large in the past, as one would have expected, governments only deal with issues that they think will be of importance in the next election. And therefore their time horizons in defining problems and priorities have been dictated purely by this consideration.

But you find that with greater awareness on what's going to happen in the future populations in various countries and communities and societies at large are getting very concerned about some of these issues.

Now if they start bringing the long-term implications of today's policies and actions into the political agenda for debate, discussion and choice of government, then clearly politicians will also be affected.

And therefore what you need today is a set of leaders who can read the writing on the wall, who can anticipate this movement and then take a leadership position that's not purely a matter of political convenience. Also because they are deeply convinced that this is good for humanity and this is good for the societies that they themselves are responsible for.

NR: In 2000 Robert Kaplan wrote a book called “The Coming Anarchy.” And certainly reading through the challenges facing the earth, some of the statistics, some of the trends, it's clear that there is a huge possibility for social breakdown or an atmosphere of despair to arise, perhaps as bad as happened in Europe between the wars.

Do you think this will happen, what could be done to avoid it, and if it does happen, can you indicate what possible consequences it could have?

PACHAURI: Well, I think the possibility is certainly there that something like this might happen, but I'd like to believe that given the information age that we're in today people would be able to see symptoms and signs of this well before it actually occurs, and therefore we would be able to put in place response strategies that will help avert crisis of this nature.

But this is exactly where I believe leadership is going to be critical. You need a few giant and tall leaders, who can see the future, who are prepared to show their conviction in the form of actions and deed, and unless we have that, and if people are just going to be opportunistic in leadership positions, then I'm afraid they'll ignore the reality and the very basics of some of these threats that we're likely to face.

NR: Faced with all of these challenges, Mike Childs of the Friends of the Earth said we need to depend on humankind's ingenuity. Do you have faith that this ingenuity is enough?

PACHAURI: Well, that ingenuity is there as a capacity. It has a potential, but are we going to harness that potential? Lester Brown, who I have a great deal of respect for, put it succinctly. He said 'Communism collapsed because it told lies about the economy – and capitalism will collapse if we tell lies about the ecology.'
Energy security: A state side view

United States Representative Tom Lantos, the Chairman of the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs, tells NATO Review how he sees NATO’s changing role and what NATO and its members can do in the increasingly important field of energy security.

NATO Review: To begin, please describe your general views about the current state of NATO and transatlantic relations more generally. How does your background as someone who was born in Europe and lived through the Second World War shape your beliefs concerning the importance of American and European cooperation?

Tom Lantos: Throughout the Cold War, the United States and Europe were unified in opposition to the menace of the Soviet Union. The relationship was strengthened by the shared belief that communism represented an existential threat to the very foundations of human freedom. But without that unifying force, the transatlantic alliance has weakened and needs to be reinvigorated.

NATO and its member nations face a stark choice: the Alliance could evolve into a reliable military partner of the United States that hails terrorism and rogue regimes that threaten citizens on both side of the Atlantic.

Or it could devolve into a collection of governments that are only rhetorically committed to the common defence while their individual nations may or may not tackle the security challenges of a post-9/11 world.

This relationship can be revitalized in Afghanistan, as a NATO victory there would be a lifeline for the alliance and proof of NATO’s continued relevance in the post-Cold War world.

The United States should also continue to work with the European Union in addressing areas where freedom is suppressed, including the importance of resolving the final status of Kosovo and the increasing challenges created by an energy-fueled Russia.

NR: How big a role, in your view, should NATO play in issues related to energy security?

Lantos: Each of the member states in NATO has a stake in creating a suitable energy security framework. Energy security can play a significant role in wider security and geopolitical matters for Europe and North America and therefore should be a priority for NATO.

Since giving this interview to NATO Review, Tom Lantos died from cancer complications. He was 80. Mr Lantos, who lost nearly his entire family to the Holocaust, was in his 14th term in office. He was the only Holocaust survivor ever elected to Congress.
NR: How confident are you about Russia’s reliability as an energy partner?

Lantos: Russia has taken an increasingly aggressive posture on energy policy, fuelled by its energy-based economic boom. I share the concern of many Europeans when Russia utilizes its energy resources to bend its neighbours to its political will, most egregiously by cutting off natural gas supplies in the dead of winter to former Soviet republics.

I was a vocal critic of President Putin’s politically motivated efforts to dismantle Yukos and centralize control in the Kremlin, contributing to the rising trend of resource nationalism among energy-rich countries.

And I believe that the Russians will eventually realize that the short term confidence that comes from high energy prices is not in their long term political and security interest and will instead acknowledge that their future lies in respectful and cooperative relations with the United States and Europe.

NR: Is energy conservation a security issue? If so, should NATO be involved in Allied energy conservation through information-sharing and the like?

Lantos: Energy conservation is most certainly a security issue; cutting back our energy consumption reduces our dependence on resources from other countries, particularly unstable countries, to help us meet our energy needs. Conservation can play a role in providing energy security for many NATO members. It is uncertain, however, whether NATO is the best equipped organization to tackle such issues.

NR: How important is funding and developing alternative technologies such as solar, wind, hydrogen-based, and photovoltaic energy?

Lantos: Funding and developing alternative technologies such as these are important in providing for our national energy security. The energy bill HR 3221, which recently passed the House and had a significant foreign affairs title that I cosponsored, provided for such measures.

NR: Do you believe that NATO should play a greater role in the Middle East, given that region’s importance in issues related to energy security?

Lantos: NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan since 2001 demonstrate that Americans and Europeans are willing to conduct tough combat operations outside Europe. Indeed, the most significant challenge facing NATO at present – as well as the greatest opportunity for meaningful and effective action – is the mission in Afghanistan.

The question is not whether Afghanistan, which is NATO’s most ambitious mission since its founding in 1949, will fail but whether the United States will prevent its failure virtually alone or in full concert with all NATO allies.

While people from many NATO countries are fighting and dying in Afghanistan, many more countries are placing caveats on the operations of their troops or failing to engage actively in a country whose stability and success affects both Europe and the United States.

Although Dutch, British, Danish, and Canadian troops have actively engaged in dangerous combat, the mission requires more support from German and French and other European troops.

NR: What role, if any, do you believe that NATO should play in confronting Iran over its nuclear programme?

Lantos: It is increasingly important for NATO and its member nations to define what role the alliance is able, or willing, to perform in military conflicts outside of the relatively peaceful confines of Europe. They must understand the expanding definition of the term “invaded,” whereby terror groups can invade a country without a standing army.

They must also accept the expanding geographic reach of dangerous countries developing weapons of mass destruction or making nuclear weapons technology available to others.
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While every attempt will be made to keep to this schedule, it may be subject to changes over the year.

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NRSPBUCENG_0308
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